We provide a new, more general, definition for the irreversibility effect and demonstrate its relevance to problems involving environmental and other decisions under uncertainty. We establish several analytical and numerical results that suggest both that the effect holds more widely than generally recognized, and that an existing result (Epstein's Theorem), giving a sufficient condition for determining whether the effect holds, can be applied more widely than previously indicated, in particular to problems involving intertemporally nonseparable benefit functions. We further show that a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution will however result in failure of the effect.
Introduction
Environmental impacts of an investment in resource development can be long lasting, or even irreversible. This is a feature of environmental valuation and decision problems that has received a great deal of attention in the literature, based on findings in the natural sciences. For example, there is both scientific and popular concern today about loss of biodiversity, the genetic information that is potentially valuable in medicine, agriculture, and other productive activities. Much of the concern is for endangered species, or their habitats such as tropical moist forests that are subject to more or less irreversible conversion to other uses. But even if species survival is not at issue, biological impacts can be very difficult to reverse over any relevant time span. The clear-cutting of a climax forest species, for example, removes the results of an ecological succession that may represent centuries of natural processes. Regeneration may not lead to the original configuration, as opportunistic species such as hardy grasses come in and preempt the niche otherwise filled by the climax species (Albers & Goldbach 2000) .
Irreversibilities have also been identified as a key feature of the problem of how to respond to potential impacts of climate change. Emissions of greenhouse gases, in particular carbon dioxide, accumulate in the atmosphere and decay only slowly. According to one calculation, assuming business-as-usual use of fossil fuels over the next several decades, after a thousand years carbon dioxide concentrations will still be well over twice the current level, and nearly three times the pre-industrial level, and will remain elevated for many thousands of years (Schultz & Kasting 1997) . There is also some prospect of essentially irreversible catastrophic impact as would result for example from the disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and consequent rise in sea level of 15-20 feet. Recent findings suggest that this possibility is more serious, and perhaps closer in time, than economists (and others) have realized ( (Kerr 1998) and (de Angelis & Skvarca 2003) ).
Irreversibilities are of course not confined to environmental decisions, but occur in a wide variety of economic settings, as the definitive work on investment decisions under uncertainty by Dixit & Pindyck (1994) makes clear.
In the environmental economics literature the analysis of investment decisions under uncertainty and irreversibility was introduced by Arrow & Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974) , who show that, for a linear net benefit function or an all-or-nothing choice, it will be optimal to delay or reduce investment, for example in a water resource development project in a natural environment, if future net benefits are uncertain, investment decisions are irreversible, and there is a possibility of learning about future benefits. Dixit and Pindyck and others establish essentially the same result for the more general investment problem, broadening the treatment to include nonlinear benefit functions and continuous choices, at the same time greatly enriching the analysis with a rigorous treatment of stochastic optimization.
Beginning with the seminal paper by Epstein (1980) on decision-making and the temporal resolution of uncertainty, and including important contributions by Freixas & Laffont (1984) , Hanemann (1989) , Kolstad (1996) , Ulph & Ulph (1997) , Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000) , and Ha- Duong & Treich (2004) , another strand of the literature has focused on the question of whether the rather strong and unambiguous results of Arrow and Fisher, Henry, and Dixit and Pindyck, continue to hold in still more general settings in which the intertemporal benefit function exhibits properties not considered by these authors.
In this paper we take up the discussion of several aspects of this question. The next section reviews existing definitions of the irreversibility effect and proposes a new one, which we show in Section 3 to be more generally applicable. Section 4 develops a numerical example to prove that the only necessary condition in the literature is, in fact, sufficient but not necessary, while Section 5 establishes that one of the mostly widely used sufficient conditions in the literature, due to Epstein (1980) , is more widely applicable than previously believed. This section also establishes conditions under which the irreversibility effect is likely to be violated. Section 6 offers some broad conclusions on the status and significance of the irreversibility effect. 
The Irreversibility Effect and the Environment
We begin by presenting two existing definitions, and one new definition, for the irreversibility effect. For this purpose consider a two-period decision problem, where in the first period the decision maker chooses a variable x 1 and in the second period a variable x 2 . Net benefits in the first period, denoted by B 1 (x 1 ), are deterministic and depend only on x 1 , but net benefits in the second period, denoted by B 2 (x 1 , x 2 , z i ), are stochastic and are a function both of x 1 , x 2 , and also of z, a random variable that reflects the underlying uncertainty about the nature of net benefits. We assume that z is a discrete random variable with M possible realizations.
Furthermore, B 1 is assumed to be concave and twice continuously differentiable in x 1 , and B 2 concave and twice continuously differentiable in x 1 and x 2 . An issue that will become of some importance is whether or not the benefit function is separable in x 1 and x 2 . In the general case where B 2 is a function of x 1 , the benefit function is said to be nonseparable.
If, on the other hand, B 2 were only a function of x 2 and z but not of x 1 , then the benefit function would be said to be separable.
In principle, there are constraints on the first-and second-period choices. C 1 denotes the constraint function for x 1 . A crucial issue in the literature is the extent to which the first period choice of x 1 constrains the future choice of x 2 . In general, we will assume that the first period choice does constrain the second period choice, the constraint on the latter being given by C 2 (x 1 ). The constraint on x 2 could take a variety of forms and, in general, it implies a loss of flexibility in the second period decision. A sharp form of the constraint would be x 1 > x 2 which implies that x 2 is constrained to be less than x 1 ; we refer to this, and any such constraint on x 2 , as the irreversibility constraint. Note that, by using a nonseparable formulation of the second period net benefit function, we already imply that the first period decision will affect the choice confronting the decision maker in the second period.
Making the second period constraint function depend on x 1 introduces a separate element of interdependence between the two choices.
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Before the second period decision is made, the decisionmaker receives a signal, denoted by y j , that reveals some information about z. This is the source of learning. y is also assumed to be a discrete random variable with N possible realizations. The amount of information contained in y depends on how closely related z and y are. Let y and y denote two potential signals where the correlation between y and z is greater than the correlation between y and z. y is said to be more informative about z, and leads to greater learning about the true nature of z, than y .
1 After the signal is received, the decisionmaker updates her prior expectations about z by formulating a posterior distribution denoted by π ij = p(z = z i /y = y j ) and then chooses x 2 for each signal to maximize the expected benefit over the different states. Also, let q j denote the probability distribution for y.
With this notation, the dynamic optimization problem is
(1) max
Finally, we assume that a unique solution exists, and lies in the interior of C 1 . Let x * 1 denote the maximum corresponding to the more informative signal y, and x * * 1 the maximum corresponding to the less informative signal y .
The conventional definition of the irreversibility effect in the literature is
Which of these two conditions applies depends on the structure of the problem. If the problem is how much wildlife habitat to keep intact in the first period and not convert to farmland, then an increase in the fraction of habitat left untouched in anticipation that the decisionmaker will learn about the relative benefits of wildlife habitats and farmlands prior 1 Note that we are adopting the same notion of learning as adopted by Epstein (1980) , who, in turn, uses the notion of greater information discussed by Marschak & Miyasawa (1968) . For a more precise definition of greater learning see Epstein (1980) .
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to the second period, as compared to the amount of habitat left untouched when there is no possibility of learning, implies an irreversibility effect. Converting a larger fraction of habitat into farmland in the first period, before uncertainty about the benefits of keeping wildlife habitats intact is resolved, would force the decisionmaker to accept lower benefits should it turn out that the benefits of habitats are larger than initially expected. If the benefits are smaller than expected then the decision maker can choose to convert more habitat into farmland in the second period, a possibility that is in no way constrained by leaving a larger fraction of the land as wildlife habitat in the first period. In this case the irreversibility effect
, where x 1 is the amount of land in wildlife habitat in the first period. On the other hand, if the decision is how much of a greenhouse gas to emit when damages due to global warming are uncertain, then a decrease in the amount emitted implies an irreversibility effect. Higher first period emissions would lock the decisionmaker into accepting whatever the nature of the damages are revealed to be, and not being able to avert damages should these turn out to be higher than expected. Should damages turn out to be lower than expected, the decisionmaker can always increase emissions in the second period. In this case the irreversibility effect holds if x * 1 ≤ x * * 1 , where x 1 is the amount of the greenhouse gas emitted in the first period.
A related definition, since the conventional definition is really about allowing for more options in the future, due to Freixas & Laffont (1984) , is
In words, the irreversibility effect is said to hold if the second period choice set associated with x larger the larger is the amount of habitat left intact in the first period. The irreversibility effect is said to hold if
We propose a third, more general definition. Definex 1 as the value of x 1 that gives maximum decisionmaking flexibility in the future. For example, if x 2 is constrained to be greater than (less than)
. This is because with x 1 = 0 (x 1 = 1) there is no constraint on the choice of x 2 , and so there is maximum decisionmaking flexibility. In terms of the second period choice setx 1 = 0 (x 1 = 1) implies a set that consists of all possible values of the second period choice variable, x 2 . We will say that an irreversibility effect exists if
that is, if the optimum corresponding to the more informative signal is at least as close to the point of maximum flexibility as the optimum corresponding to the less informative signal.
In some modelsx 1 may be a constant, while in others it may be determined by the model parameters. The virtue of this definition is that it encompasses both cases under equation (2) and is therefore independent of the structure of the problem. It is equivalent to x * 1 ≥ x * * 1 in cases where x 2 is constrained to be less than x 1 , x 1 ∈ [0, 1] and x 2 ∈ [0, 1]. In such cases, Another advantage of our definition is that it applies to problems where the two received definitions fail, namely when the decisionmaker chooses two different objects in the first and the second periods. In the farmland versus wildlife habitat example the decisionmaker chooses the same object in each period, namely the amount of habitat to leave intact.
Similarly, in the global warming example the object chosen in each period is the amount of 6 greenhouse gases to emit. However, in the case of Epstein's firm's-demand-for-capital model (discussed in detail in the next section) a different object is chosen in each period: capital in the first and labor in the second. Alternatively, faced with a decision to reserve a natural environment for wildlife habitat or recreation, a manager may choose the amount of land to set aside in the first period and the number of rangers and complementary personnel to allocate to monitoring and protection in the second period. In such models with two different choice variables, the choice made in the first period does not limit the choice set available in the second period. The amount of capital chosen in the first period does not limit the amount of labor that can be employed in the second period. The amount of land set aside for protection does not limit the number of personnel that can be employed. Consequently, a definition of irreversibility that compares the choice sets in the second period for different initial choices is not useful and will not yield any predictions about the irreversibility effect.
The other received definition of the irreversibility effect, specified in equation 2, fails as well because it is not clear which of the two conditions specified under this definition applies to such models. Our definition, on the other hand, and as we show in the next section, continues to apply.
General Definition
To establish that our definition is more general we rely on a condition established by Epstein (1980) for the irreversibility effect to hold, a sufficient condition under which the initial level of investment in a two-period model with uncertainty and the possibility of future learning is less than the initial level with uncertainty and no or less learning. Using the model in Section 2, let J(x 1 , ξ j ) denote the value function associated with the signal y j , and be defined
and is a vector of the posterior probability distribution corresponding to the signal y j . 
In words, the sufficient condition states that if the slope of the value function with respect to
, is concave (convex) in the posterior probability distribution, then the optimal choice of x 1 associated with the more informative signal is less (more) than the optimal choice associated with the less informative signal.
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Now consider Epstein's firm's-demand-for-capital example. In this example, a firm chooses its investment in capital in the first period, and determines its demand for labor in the second, in order to maximize profits. Capital is thus quasi fixed while labor is variable and moreover, in the second period the firm can not disinvest its capital. Price of the output is unknown in the first period, but the firm receives some information about output prices at the beginning of the second period. The firm therefore solves the following problem:
where K denotes capital, L denotes labor, c is the cost of capital, w is the wage rate, F is a strictly concave production function and p i is the unknown output price.
Since the first period choice, capital, enters the benefit function in the second period the benefit function is said to be intertemporally nonseparable. Note that if the firm was allowed 2 This assumption holds if B 2 (x 1 , x 2 , z) is concave in x 1 and x 2 and if for C 2 (x 1 ) = {x 2 |f (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0}, the function f is concave (Epstein 1980) . 3 This sufficient condition is hard to relate to the primitives of an economic model. As it stands it is not clear what type of model gives rise to a concave or convex slope of the value function and thus qualifies for application of Epstein's Theorem. Gollier et al. (2000) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for two classes of models under which the second derivative of the slope of the value function can in fact be signed.
8 to invest or disinvest in capital in the second period then the problem faced by the firm would become intertemporally separable. Say, for example, that the firm is allowed to invest in the capital stock in the second period, though at a higher cost. The problem described by equation (6) would change to (7) max
where K 1 denotes capital in the first period, K 2 capital in the second period, c 1 is the cost of capital in the first period and c 2 the cost in the second period. Since capital is more costly in the second period, c 2 > c 1 . Equation (7) can then be re-written as
Since the benefit function in the second period is no longer a function of K 1 , the problem is intertemporally separable. A similar case can be made for when the firm is allowed to disinvest in the second period.
Coming back now to the nonseparable version of this problem, and according to Epstein's sufficient condition, whether the irreversibility effect holds in this problem depends on the second derivative of the slope of the value function in the random variable. For the following constant elasticity of substitution production function
where a > 0, b > 0, β > −1, β = 0, 0 < µ < 1 (µ being a measure of returns to scale) and the elasticity of substitution, σ, is equal to
, Hartman (1976) has established that the third derivative of the value function depends on the relationship between the elasticity of substitution and the returns to scale. Specifically, Hartman has shown that if σ > (<)
then the demand for capital is lower (higher) when there is a possibility of 9 learning than when there is no possibility of learning. By implicitly relying on the existing definitions of the irreversibility effect, which, in turn imply that the effect holds either when There are two definitions of flexibility in the literature: one due to Freixas & Laffont (1984) , and another due to Jones & Ostroy (1984) . By Freixas and Laffont's definition of flexibility, which is equivalent to their definition for the irreversibility effect (see equation 3), the choice of capital that gives the greatest flexibility in the second period is the one that produces the largest choice set in the second period. Jones and Ostroy similarly define flexibility in terms of second period choices that can be attained from the first period position with the additional qualifier that the positions be attained at a given cost and for a particular state of the world. 4 Neither of these definitions apply to our problem, however. If the choice set in the second period is defined in terms of capital, then since capital can neither be cares about is the range of outputs 5 that can be attained for a given level of capital. If the firm learns that the price of output is likely to be high tomorrow it would want to produce more, and conversely if it learns that the price is likely to be low it would want to reduce production. Flexibility for the firm manifests itself in terms of the range of output that the firm can produce. With this definition a more flexible level of capital is one that enables the firm to produce a greater range of output in the second period.
With a production function that exhibits constant elasticity of substitution, the level of capital that enables the firm to produce the greatest range of output, in fact, depends on the model parameters. Furthermore, the level of capital that gives the greatest flexibility is lower (higher) when σ > (<)
is the set of second period positions attainable from x 1 at a cost that does not exceed α in state s. In general x * 1 is said to generate more flexibility than x * * 1 when for all α ≥ 0 and for all
Note that this is consistent with Hirshleifer & Riley (1992) who point out that flexibility is different from the range of actions which in our example would mean the range of capital or labor. We instead equate flexibility to the range of outputs.
Proposition 1. If σ > (<)
whereK is the level of capital that implies the greatest amount of flexibility, K is the minimum capital stock and K is the maximum capital stock. Proof. Letȳ(K) denote the range of output that can be achieved for a given level of capital and let γ = −µ β . Note that when σ > (<)
where L is the minimum labor and L is the maximum labor. The derivative of the range of output with respect to the capital stock is given by , the irreversibility effect holds if K * ≥ K * * , and that this is in fact the case.
Necessary Versus Sufficient Conditions
Building on the sufficient conditions established by Epstein, the literature has established other sufficient conditions for the irreversibility effect to hold, but only one necessary, and therefore more restrictive, condition, namely the condition established by Freixas & Laffont (1984) for intertemporally separable net benefit functions. With such functions, and using a sharper irreversibility constraint, x 2 ≤ x 1 , the dynamic optimization problem discussed in Section 2 simplifies to the following:
(8) max
Since x 2 is constrained to be less than or equal to x 1 , a larger value of x 1 in the first period
gives the decisionmaker more flexibility in the second period. And therefore the irreversibility effect is said to hold so long as x * 1 ≥ x * * 1 . Theorem 2 specifies the condition developed by Freixas and Laffont for the irreversibility effect to hold given that a unique solution exists.
The theorem states that the irreversibility effect holds if the value function is quasi-concave.
Freixas and Laffont establish sufficiency analytically and then develop a numerical example to show that the sufficient condition is also necessary. Their numerical example establishes that if quasi-concavity is violated then, in fact, the irreversibility effect is violated. The irreversibility effect is also shown to be equivalent to J(x 1 , ξ ) − J(x 1 , ξ) being locally increasing in x 1 where ξ is the more informative signal, ξ is the less informative signal, and
A slight modification, however, of Frexias and Laffont's numerical example shows that quasi-concavity is only sufficient. In Freixas and Laffont's numerical example the random variable z is assumed to take two possible values, z 1 and z 2 , each with probability 0.5.
Furthermore, there are two levels of learning, perfect or none at all. The functional forms of the benefit functions are,
With these benefit functions quasi-concavity is violated, x * 1 ≤ x * * 1 and J(x 1 , ξ ) − J(x 1 , ξ), the value of information, is not increasing in x 1 . These results are shown in Figure 1 where the choice variable in the first period, x 1 , is drawn on the x-axis and the value of information on the y-axis. Note that in the range [2π, 3π] the value of information decreases in x 1 . So long as the optima lie in this range the irreversibility effect is violated. Now consider a slight modification where B 1 (x 1 ) and B 2 (x 2 , z 1 ) remain unchanged and B 2 (x 2 , z 2 ) is given by 
The original and modified benefit functions are illustrated in Figure 2 . Both functions are identical in the range [0, 2π] and thereafter the original function is represented by the dotted line and the modified function by the broken line.
(strictly greater if the optimal lies between π and 2π and equal otherwise) and the value of information is no longer decreasing over a finite interval of x 1 . These results are shown in Figure 3 . The irreversibility effect holds though quasi-concavity is violated. Consequently, quasi-concavity is not necessary, merely sufficient, for the irreversibility effect to hold in the class of intertemporally separable benefit functions. We note however that quasi-concavity is a very weak condition. Most, if not all, empirically important benefit functions will exhibit this property.
In summary, to date a number of sufficient conditions have been established for the irreversibility effect, but not necessary conditions, which would be both more restrictive and more powerful.
Intertemporally Non-separable Benefits
An issue of some importance in the literature is whether or not the benefit function is separable in x 1 and x 2 . In fact, the existing sufficient conditions in the literature can be organized into two broad categories: those that apply to models with separable benefit functions and those that apply to models with non separable functions. Conditions developed by Freixas & Laffont (1984) and Kolstad (1996) , for example, apply to separable models, while those developed by Epstein (1980) , Ulph & Ulph (1997) , and Gollier et al. (2000) , to non-separable models.
There is, however, a perception in the literature that Epstein's condition can not be used to investigate the irreversibility effect in some models with intertemporally non separable benefit functions, in particular models of global warming where damages depend on the amount of accumulated greenhouse gases making the damage function non separable (for example, see Ulph & Ulph (1997) and Gollier et al. (2000) ). As shown in Section 3, so long as one uses our more general definition of the irreversibility effect, which, in particular, forces one to determine the point of maximum flexibility, Epstein's sufficient condition can be used for at least some intertemporally non separable benefit functions. In this section,
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we establish that Epstein's conditions can be used in the environmental application to the optimal control of greenhouse gas emissions. This also helps us to identify a class of models where in fact the irreversibility effect is violated.
Consider a simple variant of the global warming model presented by Ulph & Ulph (1997) where the decisionmaker solves the following dynamic optimization problem:
where V (.) is the first period benefit function, W (.) the benefit function in the second period, and D(.) the damage function. Furthermore, e 0 is the initial stock of greenhouse gases, x the stock at the end of the first period, and y the stock of greenhouse gases at the end of the second period.
(1 − δ) is the rate of decay of the stock of greenhouse gases, ρ the discount factor, and θ a discrete random variable that reflects the underlying uncertainty about the potential damages from the stock of greenhouse gases. q j and π ij are as previously defined in Section 2. The flows of greenhouse gases in both periods are constrained to be non-negative, which, in turn, imply that the stock of greenhouse gases at the end of the second period is constrained to be no smaller than δ times the stock at the end of the first period. With these assumptions a smaller stock at the end of the first period gives the decision maker greater flexibility. Therefore,x = δe 0 and the irreversibility effect then holds
This problem is structurally identical to the consumption and savings problem discussed by Epstein (1980) in which an individual allocates an initial amount of wealth between consumption and savings over three periods. Investment in the first period yields a fixed return while investment in the second period yields a random return. Some information is gained about the random rate of return at the beginning of the second period. The individual solves the following problem:
where x 1 and x 2 denote savings in periods 1 and 2 respectively, w 1 the initial wealth, 1 β is the discount factor, r the sure gross rate of return to first period savings realized at the beginning of period 2, and z i the random gross return to second period savings that is realized at the beginning of period 3. 8 Since savings in the second period are constrained to be less than r times the savings at the end of the first period, higher savings in the first period lead to greater flexibility in the second period. Therefore,x 1 = w and the irreversibility effect is said to hold if |x * 1 − w| ≤ |x * * 1 − w|. Since consumption is constrained to be positive, x 1 < w, and the condition simplifies to x * 1 ≥ x * * 1 .
Using the following constant relative risk aversion utility function,
where α is the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA), Epstein establishes that the effect of learning on the optimal level of savings in the first period depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, that is, on σ = 1 α . When σ > 1 the slope of the value function is convex and the possibility of learning about the future rate of return leads to an increase in savings in the first period and when σ < 1 the possibility of learning leads to a decrease in the level of first period savings. 9 Since the level of first period savings does not unambiguously 8 There are two minor differences between the models. First, the consumption-savings problem spans three periods while the global warming problem spans two. Second, the global warming problem assumes a multiplicative form for the underlying uncertainty while the consumptions-savings model places no such restriction on the nature of uncertainty. In terms of the model described in Section 2, multiplicative uncertainty implies that B 2 (x 1 , x 2 , z i ) = z i B 2 (x 1 , x 2 ). The first difference is of no consequence as there is no additional learning in the three-period model while the second difference makes the global warming problem a special case of the consumption-savings problem. 9 Note that Gollier et al. (2000) generalize this result by showing that it can be extended to a more general class of preferences, hyperbolic absolute risk aversion. Specifically, within the class of models characterized increase with learning, this is evidence that the irreversibility effect is sometimes violated in this problem. Specifically, the irreversibility effect is violated when σ < 1, that is, when benefits are intertemporally non-substitutable or the coefficient of relative risk aversion is large. In fact, and as established by Ha-Duong & Treich (2004) using isoelastic preferences that, unlike Von-Neumann-Morgenstern perferences, do not constrain risk aversion to be the reciprocal of the coefficient of risk aversion, the violation of the irreversibility effect in this case is caused by a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution and not by a high coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Given the structural similarity between this and the global warming problem, this result implies that the irreversibility effect will be violated under certain model parameters for the global warming problem. Specifically, following Epstein's proof, it is easy to show that when σ < 1 the slope of the value function for the global warming problem is convex, and an increase in learning leads to an increase in the stock of greenhouse gases in the first period.
The irreversibility effect is therefore violated when σ < 1.
Ulph and Ulph, however, do not use constant relative risk aversion preferences but instead assume that the benefit and the damage functions are quadratic. Specifically,
With these preferences, the coefficient of relative risk aversion associated with the net benefit function in the second period,
Furthermore, it is easy to show that CRRA 1 iff 2(a 2 + a 3 )y (a 1 + a 2 δx). Whether CRRA is greater or less than one then depends on parameter values and on the values by hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences, that is, with utility functions
where x is a function of x 1 and x 2 , and the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is η + x γ , the slope of the value function is concave (convex) in the random variable if and only if γ < 1 (γ > 1 or γ < 0). Note that if η = 0 in equation (12), then hyperbolic absolute risk preferences reduce to constant relative risk aversion preferences and γ can be interpreted as the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
of endogenous variables, namely, the stock of greenhouse gases in the first and the second period. Ulph and Ulph also establish that with these preferences the slope of the value function is neither concave nor convex, and conclude that Epstein's sufficient condition cannot be applied to a model of global warming with non separable benefit functions. The authors accordingly develop a new sufficient condition: the irreversibility effect is said to hold if the irreversibility constraint bites when there is no possibility of learning. In terms of our canonical model, let x * * 2 and x * * 1 denote the optimal decisions in the absence of learning.
If x 1 ≤ x 2 , then x * * 2 = x * * 1 implies that the irreversibility constraint bites in the absence of learning.
10 Note, however, that it is the functional form of the benefit and damage functions that yields the ambiguity, and causes Epstein's condition to fail, and not the fact that the global warming problem is inherently nonseparable. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we set out to interpret and extend the strand of the irreversibility effect literature that has focused on the question of whether the rather strong and unambiguous results of Arrow and Fisher, Henry, and Dixit and Pindyck, continue to hold in still more general settings in which the intertemporal benefit function exhibits properties not considered by these authors. We have tried to build on this literature in a number of ways.
We have introduced a more general definition of the irreversibility effect. Our definition encompasses the existing ones, and is independent of the structure of the problem. It applies to problems where the existing definitions fail, namely where the decisionmaker chooses two 10 In the same vein Kolstad (1996) shows that the irreversibility effect holds in models with effective irreversibility-that is, in models in which the irreversibility constraint bites. 11 As pointed out by one of our reviewers, there are two types of ambiguities that arise in the application of Epstein's conditions. The first, and the one that arises in the firm's-demand-for-capital example, and in the consumption-savings example, arises because the slope of the value function varies with model parameters.
A priori, and without specifying the values of model parameters, one cannot determine whether the slope of the value function is concave or convex. However, once the parameter values have been specified, one can determine unambiguously whether the slope is convex or concave. The second type of ambiguity, the one referred to by Ulph & Ulph (1997) , arises when the slope of the first derivative of the value function is neither concave nor convex irrespective of the parameter values. That is, even once the parameter values have been specified, one cannot determine whether the slope of the value function is concave or convex.
20 different objects in the first and the second periods, say producible capital or protected land in the first and the relevant labor complement in the second. In such problems the existing definitions are not helpful. Our definition, on the other hand, by forcing one to consider which choice generates the most flexibility, continues to apply.
Applications of our definition, and a numerical example which shows that the only necessary condition in the literature is only sufficient, establish that the irreversibility effect holds more widely than has perhaps previously been recognized. Another interesting interpretive result is that Epstein's condition, the original contribution to this literature, and Theorem 1 in our paper, can in fact be applied more widely, in particular to intertemporally nonseparable benefit functions, as in the global warming problem, than previously indicated.
